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ABSTRACT 
ALLISON EVANS:  Portfolio Manager Ownership and Mutual Fund Performance 
(Under the direction of Douglas Shackelford) 
 
This paper examines the association between a mutual fund manager’s personal fund 
investment and mutual fund performance.  Newly-released managerial ownership disclosures 
reveal that fund ownership varies across mutual fund managers and, in many instances, is 
quite large.  I find that mutual fund returns are increasing in the level of managerial fund 
investment, consistent with managerial ownership realigning decision-maker and shareholder 
interests.  Also consistent with the reduction of agency costs, I find that managerial 
ownership is inversely related to fund turnover, which could affect both tax and trading costs.  
However, I do not find any association between portfolio manager ownership and a mutual 
fund’s tax burden. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
 
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether a fund manager’s personal ownership of 
mutual fund shares is associated with differences in mutual fund performance.  Specifically, 
this paper examines whether mutual funds with higher levels of managerial ownership 
experience higher returns and/or lower fund costs.  Such a finding would be consistent with 
fund ownership reducing agency costs between managers and fund shareholders in the 
mutual fund industry, beyond the current compensation structure.  Over the years 2001-2004, 
I find that managerial ownership is positively related to fund returns, inversely related to 
turnover levels, and unrelated to the fund’s tax burden.   
 The relation between a manager’s investment in his business and the performance of that 
business has generated interest across the fields of accounting, finance, and economics.  
Many papers, including Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) seminal work, have analyzed the 
effects of the separation of ownership and control, as well as compensation structures that 
attempt to realign incentives between the two.  Studies have examined, for instance, the 
effect of firm managerial ownership on discretionary accounting adjustments (e.g., Warfield 
et al., 1995), disclosure decisions (e.g., Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; Nagar et al., 2003), 
dividend policy (e.g., Lambert et al., 1989; Chetty and Saez, 2005; Brown et al., 2005), 
inventory choices (e.g., Hunt, 1985; Niehaus, 1989), investment decisions (e.g., Clinch, 
1991), market valuation (e.g., Morck et al., 1988) and future earnings (Hanlon et al., 2005).      
2Similar examinations of the relation between a manager’s share ownership and 
performance have never been attempted in the mutual fund arena because managerial fund 
ownership data have been unavailable prior to this year.1 Since mutual fund managers are 
not required to own fund shares, many researchers have assumed that their investment is 
small.  Jin (2006), for instance, assumes that, since mutual funds managers generally are not 
required to own shares in their fund, they have no personal reason to care about fund tax 
consequences.  This statement implies that the lack of an explicit requirement to own fund 
shares is equivalent to a manager not making a material investment in his fund.  This 
assumption, though common, is contrary to the findings in this study.  Of the 237 mutual 
fund portfolios in my sample, 22 percent have managers who have personally invested over 
$1,000,000 in their fund.   
 In addition to being a vehicle to extend the agency literature, mutual funds are important 
in their own right.  Mutual funds are playing an increasingly large role in domestic equity 
markets, as documented by the Investment Company Institute (ICI, 2005).  The ICI reports 
that the mutual fund industry managed $8.1 trillion and held approximately 22% of the 
outstanding stock of US companies in 2004.  At the same time, regulators and fund investors 
are increasing their focus on the trading behavior of fund managers after the revelation of 
several recent trading abuses.  This increased scrutiny culminated in the SEC’s new 
regulation requiring mutual funds to disclose managerial ownership levels, compensation 
structure, and conflicts of interest.2 Any empirical documentation of factors that may 
 
1 Tufano and Sevick (1997), Qian (2005), and Meschke (2005) study agency problems with respect to fund 
boards of directors. 
 
2 US Securities & Exchange Commission, 2004.  Final Rule:  Disclosure Regarding Portfolio Managers of 
Registered Management Investment Companies.  17 Code of Federal Regulation Parts 239, 249, 270, 274.  US 
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC.  
3influence the trading decisions of mutual fund managers will benefit industry regulators, as 
well as current and potential fund investors.   
 The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 develops the hypotheses.  Section 3 
describes the data and sample selection process.  Section 4 describes the empirical 
specifications.  Sections 5 and 6 present the results from univariate and multivariate tests, 
respectively.  Section 7 concludes and details plans for future research.   
CHAPTER II 
 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Whether managerial fund ownership is associated with better fund performance is an 
empirical question.  Such a result should obtain to the extent that fund ownership alleviates 
an incentive conflict between the manager and fund investors.  Dow and Gorton (1997) 
model one such conflict, where a manager who actively searches for profitable trading 
opportunities and finds none will still execute trades, though they may actually decrease fund 
value.  This action results from incentives embedded in the manager’s compensation 
contract, formulated based on the inability for outsiders to distinguish informed non-trading 
from a manager’s shirking his responsibilities or having no talent to pick good stocks.  Thus, 
Dow and Gorton posit that a manager’s compensation creates incentives for him to make 
trades, even value-reducing ones.    
 Though their compensation is based primarily on net assets under management, many 
fund managers also have at least a portion of their compensation (typically the annual bonus) 
tied to fund returns.  In theory, this compensation structure should help align the desires of 
fund shareholders (higher returns) with the incentives of fund managers (personal wealth).  
Only 10 percent of the 237 fund portfolios in this sample disclosed that compensation is not 
tied to fund performance in some way.  If this compensation structure is enough to alleviate 
any existing agency issues, then fund ownership may not be associated with better fund 
returns.  If, however, the compensation structure does not fully alleviate the agency problem 
5between managers and shareholders, then I would expect fund returns to be positively 
associated with the degree of managerial ownership.  The SEC’s stated motivation for 
enacting this disclosure requirement, to “help investors assess the extent to which portfolio 
manager’s interests are aligned with theirs,” implies that current compensation arrangements 
have not alleviated regulator concerns about potential agency problems in the mutual fund 
industry.3 My first hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is that managerial fund ownership 
is positively related to fund returns.   
In a related test, I also examine whether higher levels of managerial ownership are 
associated with lower levels of fund turnover, my second hypothesis.  Finding an inverse 
relation between fund manager ownership and turnover would support the Dow and Gorton 
(1997) theory that one incentive conflict between managers and shareholders lies in fund 
turnover.  Aligning incentives between the two should help offset the incentive of managers 
to make trades purely for the sake of making trades, regardless of their potentially negative 
effect on fund value.  Lower turnover levels could also help reduce the fund’s tax burden as 
well as administrative costs (brokerage commissions and trading expenses) associated with 
each sale.  Managers who, as fund shareholders, would personally feel the effects of these 
costs (through lower fund returns) would have more of an incentive to minimize them.4 I
will interpret a negative relation between ownership and fund turnover as a reduction of 
agency costs in the mutual fund setting. 
 
3 Kunal Kapoor, Director of Fund Analysis at Morningstar, Inc., places mutual fund managers in two distinct 
categories:  money managers and fund shareholders.  This categorization reflects the opinion that fund 
managers who are personally invested in the fund likely possess more conviction, taking more care in executing 
appropriate trades, than money managers who simply perform investing services in exchange for compensation. 
 
4 Trading expenses are charged directly against the fund’s assets, thus reducing net asset value (NAV), the price 
at which fund shares are sold. 
6A manager’s incentives can often diverge from the desires of investors with respect to the 
fund’s potential tax burden.  When a fund manager trades shares held within the fund’s stock 
portfolio, he triggers capital gains or losses.  The SEC requires mutual funds to distribute net 
gains to fund shareholders each year.5 While all investors would favor a higher pre-tax 
return, only taxable investors are interested in the potential tax burden associated with fund 
distributions.  Several papers (Huddart and Narayanan, 2002; Weiss, 2002; Jin, 2006) cite 
conversations with fund managers who assert that taxes do not greatly affect trading behavior 
since shareholders vary in tax status and have different (often unobservable) marginal tax 
rates.  Yet empirical studies (Dickson and Shoven, 1995; Bergstresser and Poterba, 2002) 
find evidence of significant heterogeneity in the tax liabilities associated with different 
mutual fund investments.  This paper is the first to consider one possible explanation:  the 
manager’s personal stake in the fund.   
For a fund manager to incorporate the potential tax burden of distributions into his selling 
decisions, he would need either an influential, tax-sensitive clientele or a personal incentive 
to do so.  A fund manager’s compensation is rarely tied to a fund’s tax burden (only one of 
the sample funds does so), meaning that compensation does not provide a direct link between 
the fund’s tax burden and the fund manager’s incentives.6 However, a fund manager who 
personally owns fund shares in a taxable account could have a direct incentive to minimize 
the fund’s tax burden, since he would personally be subject to that cost.  Such personal 
ownership would align a manager’s incentives with those of taxable individuals, regardless 
 
5 To qualify as a flow-through entity, a fund must distribute at least 90% of its earnings to investors.  After the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, it must also distribute at least 98% of its realized capital gains net income, or be 
subject to an excise tax on the remaining undistributed portion.   
 
6 Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) finds that funds with a lower-after tax return (a heavier tax burden) have 
lower subsequent inflows, which could lower fund net assets and, in turn, compensation.   
7of whether they are the fund’s primary clientele.  However, even a manager with a strong 
personal desire to minimize taxes on distributions by may not alter his selling behavior if 
such a strategy would be contrary to the desires of his key investors. It is quite plausible that 
a fund’s clientele would be indifferent to taxes.  The ICI (2005) estimates that  54 percent of 
2004 mutual fund assets were held by tax-deferred or tax-exempt accounts and 37 percent 
were held in taxable household accounts.7 Hypothesis three, stated in alternative form, is that 
fund manager ownership is inversely related to a fund’s potential tax burden.  Such a relation 
would only be hypothesized to the extent that fund managers hold their shares in taxable 
accounts. 
 
7 Household accounts can either be taxable (held directly by the individual(s)) or tax-deferred (held in a 
retirement account).  Distributions received by a tax-deferred household account are not taxed until withdrawals 
are made from the account, at the ordinary tax rates in place at the time of withdrawal.   
CHAPTER III 
 SAMPLE AND DATA 
 
I hand-collect data from each fund’s Statement of Additional Information (SAI) to 
construct a measure of managerial ownership.   I only study funds with a single manager, 
which comprise nearly one-half (47%) of all Morningstar funds at the end of 2004.  My 
sample consists of funds who issued ownership disclosures from the effective date of the 
SEC ruling (February 28, 2005) to September 16, 2005.  Over these six and one-half months, 
I collected data for 273 fund portfolios of the types considered by this analysis (actively-
managed growth, value, blend, or specialty funds).8 Of those, I eliminate 36 since the 
manager data in the fund’s SAI differs from the manager information reported by 
Morningstar, leaving an initial sample of 237 actively-managed fund portfolios.9
Figure 1 illustrates the disclosed ownership levels for the initial sample of portfolios.  Half 
of the sample portfolios (49%) have managers owning $100,000 or less.  Nearly 24 percent 
have managers owning between $100,000 and $500,000, while 28 percent have managers 
who have personally invested over $500,000.  These figures reveal that fund-manager 
ownership levels are quite diverse and can be substantial.  Subsequent tests will 
 
8 I exclude 13 tax-managed funds with ownership disclosures because they are so few in number and because 
the managers of those funds may face a different incentive structure than managers of traditional funds.  
Another 13 portfolios are excluded since their shares are restricted to institutional investors.  Results are 
qualitatively unaltered when either of these groups is included in the analyses. 
 
9 The data discrepancies could take two forms.  Either the manager’s name in the SAI is different from the name 
in Morningstar’s database, or the SAI listed multiple managers, whereas Morningstar listed a sole manager. 
9examine whether these differences in ownership are associated with differences in fund 
performance. 
With the exception of the ownership and capital gain distribution information, I obtain 
data for the fund characteristics from Morningstar’s Principia database.  Following 
Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) and Plancich (2003), I extract data from each January 
release of Principia and merge them into one dataset.  Detailed long-term and short-term 
capital gain distribution data are provided by Lipper (a Reuters company that is a global 
provider of mutual fund information and analysis). 
CHAPTER IV 
 EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
 
1.  General 
This paper examines the relation between fund-manager ownership and various measures 
of fund performance (returns and costs).  Equation (1) captures the relation between each 
performance measure and managerial fund ownership: 
 PERFit = O1OWN0-100i + O2OWN100-500i + O3OWNOVER500i + O4Xit + Rit. (1)  
PERF takes on each individual performance measure, in turn.  I consolidate the disclosed 
ownership levels into three main OWN groups and create an indicator variable for each: $0-
$100,000 (OWN0-100), $100,001-$500,000 (OWN100-500), and over $500,000 
(OWNOVER500).  Each group is included in the regression with the intercept suppressed.  
Xit represents the set of covariates that could also affect a fund’s performance.  In each test, I 
only use data representing years that the current manager is at the fund.  Consequently, I 
delete any fund-year observations that fall during the sample period but before the current 
manager’s tenure.  I cluster the error term in each estimation by fund portfolio since the same 
fund may be in the sample multiple years.10 
2.  Ownership Measure 
 
10 See Petersen (2005) for a discussion of error-term clustering and entity fixed-effects. 
11
Funds disclose their manager’s personal investment at the portfolio level.  However, if the 
fund has multiple share classes, the SEC does not require the fund to disclose in which share 
class(es) a manager has made his investment.  The Eaton Vance Growth Fund, for instance, 
has class A shares (ticker symbol EVGFX), class B shares (EMGFX), and class C shares 
(ECGFX).  Eaton Vance disclosed that Arieh Coll, the Growth Fund portfolio manager, 
owned between $500,001 and $1,000,000 in the portfolio as of the most recent fiscal-year 
end.  However, the disclosure does not detail whether the investment is in class A, B, or C 
shares (or some in all three).   
Share classes do not represent fundamentally different investments.  They simply 
represent different means of entry into the same underlying set of stocks (e.g., whether a fee 
is charged upon an investor’s entry or exit from the fund).  Fifty-nine percent of the 237 
sample portfolios have multiple share classes.  Morningstar treats each share class of a fund 
as a separate fund, as do many mutual fund analyses.  However, most fund characteristics are 
the same portfolio-wide (e.g., turnover, per-share distributions, and market capitalization) 
and thus are reported as the same for every share class.11 Annual returns can also be the 
same between share classes, or only vary slightly as a result of differences in expenses 
between classes.  To avoid counting the same observation multiple times, all analyses 
consider only the largest share class of a multi-class portfolio.   
Funds disclose ownership levels using seven SEC-mandated dollar ranges.12 Over two-
thirds of the observations fall into three categories:  none (22%), $100,001-$500,000 (24%) 
and over $1,000,000 (22%).  For ease of exposition, I group the remaining four categories 
 
11 Net assets vary between share classes, as do expenses, sales loads, and Morningstar’s calculation of capital 
gains overhang.   
 
12 The seven ranges are: none, $1-$10,000, $10,001-$50,000, $50,001-$100,000, $100,001-$500,000, $500,001-
$1,000,000, and over $1,000,000. 
12
with the three primary ownership levels to create, in essence, a low, medium, and high-
ownership measure.  Within the “low” group, there is no statistical difference between the 
“none” funds and the funds with ownership between $1 and $100,000 in any specification.  I 
include the few funds that fall into the $500,001-$1,000,000 classification (6%) in the high-
ownership group (OWNOVER500), though inferences are robust to reclassifying those funds 
into the mid-ownership group.   
Ownership data have only been available since February 28, 2005 and are only disclosed 
for the fund’s most recent fiscal year end, so I assume each manager’s investment is the same 
across all years of this study (2001-2004). 13 It is possible that managers increased their 
ownership levels immediately preceding the disclosure requirement.  In that instance, my 
assumption would bias against finding significant differences in fund performance based on 
ownership.  I should also emphasize that, for a fund to be in this paper’s sample, it must be in 
existence in 2005, the year the disclosure requirement took effect.  Any fund that did not 
survive until 2005 would never have released ownership information and cannot be included 
in this study.   
 
3.  Pretax Returns 
In this section, I study the relation between a fund’s pretax returns (adjusted for the mean 
return for the fund’s style category) and managerial ownership.  The dependent variable, 
ANNRTN, is the difference between the fund’s simple annual return, as computed by 
 
13 I re-estimate this paper’s tests over shorter time periods to reduce the number of years in which I assume the 
managers’ ownership is the same as for the most recent (and only) disclosure.  Results are robust to shortening 
the time frame to 2003-2004.  Using only 2004 as a sample period substantially reduces the sample size.  
Though the trends found in subsequent tests are still present using just 2004 data, the results lose significance in 
that specification. 
 
13
Morningstar, and the mean return for all Morningstar funds within the same fund-style 
category (i.e., large-cap value, mid-cap growth) in a given year.14 
Morningstar reports returns after adjusting for fund expenses, which are taken directly out 
of each fund’s assets.15 A portion of those costs are captured by the fund’s expense ratio and 
do not reflect any decision made by the fund manager.  I consequently include the fund’s 
expense ratio as an independent variable to control for the portion of net returns that are out 
of the manager’s control.  Other costs, which are not included in the expense ratio but which 
also decrease fund returns (brokerage commissions and transaction costs), are directly related 
to the amount of trades the fund manager executes.   
I include additional covariates that could be associated with a fund’s returns.  To account 
for a fund’s systematic risk, I include BETA as a control variable. I add LAGINFLOWS to 
proxy for a fund’s need to sell additional shares to meet shareholder redemptions.16 Such 
liquidations likely took place over this time period, as mean inflows for sample funds were 
negative in 2001 and 2002.17 I also include an indicator variable to represent funds with a 
manager in his first year (NEWMGR), since new managers often make portfolio changes 
when they take over a fund.   BOND, the percentage of fund assets that is invested in bonds, 
is a covariate since stocks and bonds exhibit different patterns of returns.  I add year and 
 
14 The fund-style categories are defined by Morningstar based on analysis of each fund’s trading behavior, 
rather than the fund’s self-reported investment style. 
 
15 Those expenses include management, administrative, and 12-b1 (marketing) fees, as well as other costs taken 
out of fund assets. 
 
16 The focus of this paper is on the manager’s behavior when he buys and sells stocks held within the fund.  
However, it is also possible for fund shareholders to sell their fund shares, which funds are required to 
repurchase.  If a fund does not have enough cash to meet redemptions, it may have to sell off some of its stock.  
Negative inflows mean redemptions exceed new stock purchases within a fund.  Inflows are calculated 
following Bergstresser and Poterba (2002).  Inflows = [Total Net Assetst/Total Net Assetst-1 – (NAVt + DIVt +
GAINSt)/NAVt-1 ] /(1+AnnRtnt/2) 
 
17 The ICI (2005) also estimates that net new cash flow for equity funds was negative in 2002.   
14
fund-style indicators (e.g., large-cap value, mid-cap growth) to capture time differences and 
differences between mean fund returns based on investment objectives.  I average the 
continuous control variables over the sample period in the four-year return specification. 
 
4. After-tax Returns 
A fund’s abnormal after-tax return, again calculated using the after-tax return for the 
average fund in the same style category as a benchmark, incorporates both its return and its 
tax burden.  The SEC, since 2001, requires funds to present two after-tax returns numbers:  
annual returns after taxes on distributions, and after taxes on distributions and the sale of 
fund shares.  That ruling sets forth a common formula for funds to use to compute each 
measure.  The calculations assume distributions are received by individual shareholders in 
the top statutory tax bracket and thus represent an upper bound on the tax on distributions.  
The formula for the tax on sale assumes a fund shareholder exits the fund at the end of the 
year and thus incorporates any unrealized gain or loss on fund shares.  Funds calculate that 
tax burden based on a hypothetical shareholder with a $1,000 initial investment.  Only 
taxable investors would be subject to these tax costs.  
Controls for this specification are largely the same as for the pre-tax returns specifications.  
I also include a control variable representing the one-year lag of the fund’s capital gains 
overhang (percent of net assets that represent appreciation).  Prior research (Barclay et al., 
1998; Bergstresser and Poterba, 2002) finds evidence consistent with the level of 
appreciation within a fund influencing a manager’s selling decisions.   
5. Fund Turnover 
15
In this section, I analyze whether higher levels of fund ownership are associated with 
differences in the frequency of a fund’s trades.  An inverse relation would be consistent with 
Dow and Gorton (1997), who theorize that managerial compensation encourages noise 
trading even when no value-enhancing trades are found.  If managerial ownership reduces 
this agency problem, then higher share ownership by mutual fund managers should result in 
lower levels of share turnover.  Low turnover would help minimize selling expenses 
(brokerage and transaction costs) and potentially a fund’s tax burden, since fewer sales may 
decrease the capital gains or losses a fund would trigger.  In fact, after avoiding net taxable 
gains altogether, AllianceBernstein (2004) lists low turnover as the next-best way for 
managers to minimize the potential tax burden on mutual fund distributions.  Both 
transaction and tax costs reduce a shareholder’s return on his mutual fund investment.   
TURN, a fund’s turnover ratio, can be interpreted as the percentage of the portfolio’s 
holdings that have changed over the past year.  A low turnover (e.g., 20%-30%) would 
indicate a buy-and-hold strategy, whereas a high turnover (e.g., over 100%) indicates an 
investment strategy involving considerable buying and selling of securities.  To address the 
possibility that turnover is a proxy for fund style, I again use the mean ratio for the fund’s 
style category as a benchmark.  The resulting TURN variable represents the abnormal 
turnover volume relative to the mean for the fund’s peer group.  As in all previous tests, the 
fund’s investment style is classified by Morningstar based on its analysis of the fund’s 
trading behavior.   
I include INFLOWS as a covariate since funds with low or negative net inflows may have 
to sell additional stock to meet shareholder redemptions.  I add a fund’s current and lagged 
returns to control for the fact that managers may sell shares to lock-in gains or rebalance their 
16
portfolios following market upswings.  I also add a one-year lag of the fund’s capital gains 
overhang (LAGCGOH) since the level of unrealized gains may influence a manager’s selling 
decisions.  I include NEWMGR because a new manager may make more sales to rebalance 
his fund’s portfolio.  Year and fund-style indicators also serve as covariates, consistent with 
prior specifications.   
6. Tax Burden Measures 
 Finally, I examine the association between a manager’s ownership in his fund and the tax 
burden of that fund.  I use several different measures designed to capture different aspects of 
a fund’s tax sensitivity.  Consistent with prior tests, each measure represents the difference 
between the fund’s tax measure and the average for the same fund style category.  The first 
construct of a manager’s sensitivity to taxes on fund distributions is LTTOT, the percent of 
total gains paid out as long-term.  Plancich (2003) uses LTTOT to test whether mutual funds 
shifted more towards long-term gains after the Tax Reform Act of 1997 reduced the capital 
gains tax rate from a maximum of 28% to 20%.  She finds evidence consistent with such a 
shift.  LTTOT represents a fund’s sensitivity to individual tax incentives because in all years 
of this study, short-term capital gains are taxed at a higher rate than long-term gains.18 Since 
most dividends are now also taxed at a 15% tax rate, short-term capital gains are currently 
the most tax-disadvantageous form of mutual fund distribution.    
Though favoring long-term gains would decrease a taxable individual’s tax burden, a 
better measure of tax-sensitivity may be whether funds distribute gains at all.  
 
18 Another disadvantage of short-term gains is that they become classified as ordinary income on an individual’s 
tax return, meaning that the investor cannot utilize that distribution to offset any capital losses.  An individual’s 
capital losses can be offset by capital gains, then up to $3,000 of ordinary income.  Any remaining capital losses 
must be carried forward for use in future years. 
17
AllianceBernstein (2004) lists avoiding short-term capital gains and offsetting realized 
capital gains with capital losses as the primary tax-management techniques for mutual fund 
managers.  Dickson, Shoven, and Sialm (2000) finds that active realization of capital losses 
has a significant effect on after-tax returns for actively-managed funds.  Specifically, instead 
of distributing capital gains realized within the fund, the manager could offset those gains 
with fund losses.19 To see whether higher ownership is associated with this tax-sensitivity 
measure, PCTGAIN, the per-share dollars of gains paid out as a percent of each share’s net 
asset value, is used as a dependent variable.     
The final tax-cost measure, PCTTAX, captures the effects of dividend, short-term gain, 
and long-term gain distributions.  PCTTAX represents the maximum per-share tax burden a 
taxable individual would face on all fund distributions as a percent of the fund’s net asset 
value, relative to the average for funds in the same category. 20 If managers with larger 
personal fund investments want to minimize their current tax bill, PCTGAIN and PCTTAX 
should decrease with fund ownership.  However, it is possible that desires of a tax-insensitive 
clientele would outweigh the manager’s personal tax situation, or that the managers 
themselves hold their fund investments primarily in tax-deferred accounts. 
I include INFLOW since negative cash inflows could prompt the fund manager to increase 
stock sales to meet redemptions.  NETA, a fund’s total net assets, is included to control for 
scale effects.  I add LAGCGOH since the fund’s level of unrealized gains may affect a 
manager’s decisions, consistent with prior specifications.  I include NEWMGR since a 
 
19 A fund cannot distribute the losses it generates.  However, it may use those losses to offset gains within a 
portfolio for up to eight future years.   
 
20 PCTTAX = ((ltcg*tlt) + (stcg*tst) + (div*td))/NAV.  The tax rate on long-term capital gains (tlt) is 20% in the 
years before the enactment of the 2003 JGTRRA and 15% after it.  The tax rate on short-term gains (tst) is set 
equal to the maximum ordinary tax rate, and thus represents an upper bound on the potential tax burden from 
short-term gain distributions.  The dividend tax rate (td) is equal to the maximum ordinary tax rate in all years 
before the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, and 15% in 2003 and 2004. 
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manager in his first year may make more stock sales to rebalance the portfolio, increasing the 
potential tax burden of the fund.  I also include year and fund-style indicators to control for 
time and investment objective differences.  PCTGAIN is a regressor in the LTTOT 
specification to control for the amount of gains distributed, following Plancich (2003).   
CHAPTER V 
UNIVARIATE RESULTS 
 
Panels A and B of Table 1 present the mean, median, and standard deviation of each 
performance measure that I use as a dependent variable (returns and costs, respectively), by 
ownership level.  Before missing value deletions, the initial sample consists of 812 fund-year 
observations.  F-statistics report whether the means are fundamentally different between the 
three ownership groups.  I have adjusted those statistics to account for the fact that the same 
funds appear in the sample multiple years.   
Panel A presents univariate results for the measures of a fund’s abnormal returns.  Each 
return measure is presented and analyzed before sales loads.21 Fund returns, however 
defined, are monotonically increasing in ownership.  This increase is significant in three of 
the four return measures at the one-percent level.  Overall, these results lend initial support to 
the hypothesis that both pretax and after-tax returns are highest for funds with the highest 
level of managerial investment. 
 
21 The return figures disclosed in fund prospectuses are reported after incorporating the maximum sales load of 
the fund.  However, these sales charges are not set by the fund manager and are consequently removed from this 
analysis.  When sales loads are incorporated, the differences between mean returns based on ownership are 
magnified, implying that sales loads are lower for funds with higher levels of ownership.  Untabulated 
univariate statistics support this implication.  The mean total sales load for the low-ownership funds is 2.4 
percent, while it is only 0.64 percent for the highest-ownership group, a difference that is significant at the one-
percent level.   
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Panel B presents univariate results for the measures of a fund’s relative costs.  The 
turnover univariate statistics clearly indicate an inverse relation between the frequency of 
trading and the level of managerial ownership within a fund.  Turnover levels relative to 
fund-style averages are significantly, monotonically decreasing with managerial ownership at 
the one-percent level.  This relation is consistent with the reduction of an agency cost that 
often results in an inflated level of executed trades, as well as the minimization of selling 
expenses and/or tax costs which also have a negative effect on shareholder returns.    
The tax cost statistics in Panel B provide initial evidence of whether funds with highly-
invested managers have a lower tax burden, which would be consistent with the finding that 
those funds appear to have lower levels of fund turnover.  However, the univariate results 
indicate that there is no significant difference between any of the abnormal tax cost variables.  
LTTOT and PCTGAIN show no monotonic trend between groups.  A tax-sensitivity 
hypothesis would have predicted increasing LTTOT means (as ownership increases), since 
tax-sensitive funds would favor long-term capital gains.  The mean PCTGAIN is actually 
lowest for the low-ownership group (OWN0-100), which is also inconsistent with 
minimizing the current-year tax burden.  There is no significant difference in the percent of 
NAV that represents the total tax on distributions, though there is a monotonic decrease with 
ownership.  In sum, univariate tax cost results do not support a negative relation between 
ownership and the fund’s current tax burden. 
Panels C and D of Table 1 present univariate statistics on the control variables.  Panel C 
illustrates that there are significant differences between funds with different managerial 
investment levels.  Both net assets and capital gains overhang (the percent of net assets 
representing capital appreciation) are monotonically increasing with ownership, with 
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differences between groups significant at the one-percent level.  The percent of assets 
invested in bonds is statistically different between groups, though there is no monotonic 
trend.  The fund’s expense ratio, capturing costs outside the fund manager’s control, is 
significantly decreasing in managerial ownership, consistent with managers choosing to 
invest in funds with lower expenses.   
 Panel D shows the breakdown of the fund ownership levels by the type of fund.  The 
funds with highly-invested managers are more evenly spread amongst the fund types 
(ranging from 7 percent in large value funds to 13 percent in large blend funds).  In 
comparison, category holdings in the low- (mid-) ownership group ranges from a low of 2 (0) 
percent to a high of 19 (20) percent.  The high-ownership group has significantly higher 
ownership concentrations in the mid- and small-cap value funds relative to the other fund 
categories.  As expected, fewer of the OWNOVER500 funds have managers in their first 
year with the fund.  
CHAPTER VI 
MULTIVARIATE RESULTS 
 
1. Pretax Returns 
 In both of the pretax returns specifications in Table 2, the OWN coefficients in Panel A 
are monotonically increasing with ownership.  Panel B shows the comparisons between the 
OWN coefficients and presents the significance of the F-value using a one-tailed test.  In the 
current and annualized four-year return regressions, the coefficient on OWNOVER500 is 
significantly higher, at the one-percent level, than the coefficient for the lowest ownership 
group.  This result is consistent with highly-invested fund managers making trades and 
investments that lead to higher returns and minimizing selling costs that decrease those fund 
returns.  This finding supports the argument that managerial share ownership helps align 
incentives between fund managers and fund shareholders, consistent with the SEC’s 
motivation for enacting the disclosure requirement.22 
Besides the fund investment style and year, which explain a large amount of mutual 
fund’s annual returns, prior period inflows are negatively related to abnormal returns at the 
five-percent level.  This result is consistent with the difficulty in managing an increasing 
asset base.   
 
22 In a separate analysis, I examined whether cumulative returns are higher for high-ownership funds.  I studied 
cumulative, four-year returns for the subset of funds that were in existence and had complete data over the 
entire sample period.  While the resulting sample was quite small (57 observations), the results are consistent 
with the tabulated returns analyses.  HIGH funds had significantly higher cumulative returns than the LOW 
funds at the one-percent significance level. 
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 2. After-Tax Returns 
 Similar to the pretax returns specifications, the coefficients in both after-tax 
specifications in Table 2 are monotonically increasing in ownership.  Panel B illustrates that, 
consistent with the pretax comparisons, the difference between the lowest and highest OWN 
groups in both specifications is significant at either the one- or five-percent level.  Results on 
the control variables are also similar to the results in the pretax specifications, with inflows 
being negatively related to returns.  Overall, the results from this section reinforce the 
univariate finding that returns are significantly, positively associated with ownership.   
 
3.  Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation 
Of concern in the foregoing analysis is the potential endogeneity of the ownership choice; 
specifically, that high fund returns could be causing high managerial ownership.  To address 
this concern, I have estimated a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression.  For the purposes 
of this estimation, I redefine my ownership variable to equal one if the level of managerial 
ownership falls into the “high” group (over $500,000) and zero otherwise.23 The first stage is 
a logistic estimation in which I regress the binary OWN variable on fund style, lagged 
abnormal fund returns, and a measure of manager compensation since managers with higher 
income will have more to invest.  Because fund managers are largely compensated based on 
net assets under management, I use total net assets as the compensation proxy.  The Pearson 
correlation coefficient between the dichotomous OWN variable and total net assets is 0.30, 
which is significant at the one-percent level.  Total net assets are uncorrelated with abnormal 
returns (a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.004) and thus can be considered an appropriate 
instrument for the first stage.  Estimating 2SLS with this structure does not result in a change 
 
23 Inferences from the earlier OLS regressions hold using this binary measure. 
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in inferences from the original OLS estimation.24 The coefficient on the predicted OWN 
value from the first stage is significant at the five-percent level. 
 
4.  Turnover 
Results from the turnover regression are found in Table 3.  Consistent with the univariate 
results, turnover levels (mean-adjusted for the fund’s investment style) are decreasing with 
fund ownership.  Panel B reports that both the mid- and high-ownership funds have 
significantly lower turnover ratios than OWN0-100 funds at the one-percent level.  These 
results are consistent with personal fund ownership reducing managerial incentives to inflate 
fund turnover to appear competent as a manager and increase compensation.  Decreasing the 
amount of noise trading should also result in an increase of fund returns following Dow and 
Gorton (1997), which is consistent with the results presented in Table 2.  Thus, managerial 
ownership’s relation to both returns (a positive relation) and turnover (a negative relation) in 
this paper is consistent with ownership reducing agency costs in the mutual fund setting. 
Minimizing turnover-related costs, through executing fewer trades, also helps maximize 
the return of all shareholders (including the return of the manager).  Executing fewer trades 
reduces transaction costs and possibly decreases the fund’s tax burden.  In addition, results 
from the control variables reveal that turnover is negatively related to a fund’s net assets 
under management.  Turnover is also negatively related to a fund’s prior year return and 
capital gains overhang, consistent with selling to lock-in gains. 
 
5.  Tax Costs 
24 Though the primary endogeneity concern is between ownership and pretax returns, I have also estimated 
2SLS using each of the two after-tax return figures.  Inferences remain unchanged. 
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The fact that the significance between OWN coefficients is no greater in the after-tax 
return specifications than in the pretax specification suggests that the fund’s tax burden may 
not be reduced as a result of a highly-invested manager executing trades. However, those 
funds with highly-invested managers also have lower fund turnover, a common strategy for 
tax-minimization in mutual funds.  As a direct test of whether the tax burden is reduced in 
funds with highly-invested managers, I analyze three tax-sensitivity measures.   
The results from these regressions are presented in Table 4.  There is no clear trend 
between ownership coefficients in any of the three specifications and there is no significant 
difference between ownership groups.  Such results suggest that a fund manager’s ownership 
and the fund’s tax burden have no relation to one another.  These findings are consistent with 
fund managers trading on behalf of a tax-insensitive clientele, or a clientele of unknown tax 
status.  They are also consistent with the anecdotal claims that managers trade irrespective of 
the tax implications of their behavior.  The fact that funds with highly-invested managers do 
not appear to tax-manage to minimize their own tax burden could also indicate that managers 
hold mutual fund shares in tax-deferred accounts, though ownership disclosures are not 
required to denote in what kind of account(s) the manager holds his investment.  Thus, while 
certain research has shown that managers, as a whole, engage in some degree of tax planning 
(Bhabra et al., 1999; Gibson, et al., 2000; Huddart and Narayan, 2002; Plancich, 2003), the 
results of this analysis do not support the hypothesis that managers with higher ownership 
engage in more tax-planning than managers without a substantial personal fund investment.  
Results from control variables indicate that a fund’s tax burden is positively related to the 
capital gains overhang at the beginning of the year.  This relation is consistent with overhang 
affecting trading decisions, consistent with prior research (Barclay et al., 1998; Bergstresser 
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and Poterba, 2002).  LTTOT is positively related to the percentage of net asset value paid out 
as gains.  It is also significantly higher for funds with new managers who make initial 
portfolio changes when they take over the fund.   
 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
 
As the share of the market owned by mutual funds continues to rise, determining the 
factors that affect fund manager trading behavior has become increasingly important.  This 
paper uses newly-disclosed managerial ownership data and details of other fund 
characteristics from the years 2001-2004 to study the relation between a manager’s personal 
wealth and the performance of his fund.  I find that managerial fund ownership varies widely, 
with approximately one out of every two managers owning over $100,000 in his fund, and 
one out of every five managers owning over $1,000,000.   
Higher ownership is positively associated with mutual fund returns and negatively related 
to fund turnover.  Both findings are consistent with the reduction of the agency costs set forth 
in the Dow and Gorton (1997) model, where managers make value-reducing trades in lieu of 
making no trades when they cannot identify any suitable investments.  This paper’s tax 
analyses do not find evidence of increased tax-sensitivity in funds with highly-invested 
managers.  This result is consistent with trading for a tax-insensitive clientele, a clientele of 
unknown tax status, or with a manager holding shares in a tax-deferred retirement account.   
Investors should consider many variables when they choose to invest in mutual fund 
shares.  The optimal fund choice for each individual depends on his goals, investment 
horizon, and risk profile.  However, the results of this study suggest that investors of any tax 
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status may need to add managerial ownership to the list of variables to consider when 
choosing a mutual fund investment.  
Future research will continue to develop the database of managerial ownership 
disclosures.  In addition to expanding tests of the relation between ownership and returns, 
additional analyses will examine the relation between ownership and future returns.  Very 
preliminary tests based on the first three quarters in 2005 do not support a positive relation 
between managerial ownership and future fund returns.  However, multiple years of 
ownership and returns data will be required to test this relation. 
Another related analysis will examine multi-manager funds, and test whether ownership 
incentives or fund management, in general, varies between sole-managed and team-managed  
funds.  In addition, I will undertake further analysis into the relation between fund manager 
ownership and a fund’s tax burden.  I plan to use a methodology similar to that employed by 
Huddart and Narayanan (2002), using quarterly stock holdings to further investigate the 
influence of capital gain taxation on fund manager’s stock-sale decisions.   
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FIGURE 1 
Level of Mutual Fund Portfolio Manager Ownership 
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TABLE 1  
 Descriptive Statistics by Level of Managerial Ownership 
PANEL A – Abnormal Fund Returns  
 
$0-
$100,000  
$100,001-
$500,000  
over 
$500,000  F-value Pr > F 
ANNRTN         
Mean -0.41  1.6  2.7  7.1 0.001 
 Median -0.54  0.75  1.3    
 Std Deviation 8.8  11.2  9.6    
AFTTAX RTN - Distrib         
 Mean 0.047  2.1  3.2  6.3 0.002 
 Median -0.24  1.0  1.4    
 Std Deviation 9.4  11.3  10.4    
AFTTAX RTN – Distrib/Sale         
 Mean 0.41  1.3  1.7  2.3 0.10 
 Median 0.14  0.42  0.69    
 Std Deviation 6.2  7.3  7.2    
The number of observations is 812 before missing data deletions (136 for the four-year return variable).  
All variables are in excess of the fund-style mean. 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS:  ANNRTN = fund's percentage annual return; AFTTAX RTN-Distrib 
(Distrib & Sale) = fund's percentage annual return including tax burden from fund distributions (and 
assuming shareholder exits the fund at year-end), calculated per SEC regulations. 
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TABLE 1  
Descriptive Statistics by Level of Managerial Ownership 
PANEL B – Abnormal Fund Costs  
 
$0-
$100,000  
$100,001-
$500,000  
over 
$500,000  F-value Pr > F 
Turnover
TURN         
 Mean 10.9  -44.7  -58.7  6.1 0.003 
 Median -33.0  -52.5  -63.0    
 Std Deviation 192.8  86.2  57.5    
 
Tax Costs
LTTOT         
 Mean 0.087  -0.012  0.10  1.7 0.18 
 Median 0.17  0.14  0.17    
 Std Deviation 0.30  0.37  0.26    
PCTGAIN         
 Mean 0.00059  0.0025  0.00046  0.18 0.83 
 Median -0.0039  -0.0039  -0.0039    
 Std Deviation 0.026  0.038  0.025    
PCTTAX       
Mean 0.0013  0.00042  -0.00061  2.0 0.14 
 Median -0.00093  -0.00093  -0.0013    
 Std Deviation 0.010  0.0067  0.0056    
The number of observations is 812 before missing data deletions. All variables are in excess of the fund-
style mean. 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS: TURN = fund's turnover ratio; LTTOT = ratio of a fund's long-term to total 
capital gain; PCTGAIN = percent of a fund's net asset value paid out as capital gains; PCTTAX = per-share 
maximum tax burden on distribution as a percent of a fund's net asset value. 
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TABLE 1  
Descriptive Statistics by Level of Managerial Ownership 
PANEL C – Continuous Control Variables 
 
$0-$100,000
$100,001-
$500,000  
over 
$500,000  f-value Pr > f 
CGOH         
Mean -20.8  -13.6  9.7  7.0 0.0012 
 Median -1.0  5.0  15.5    
 Std Deviation 101.8  82.8  28.7    
 EXPRATIO         
 Mean 1.6  1.3  1.3  7.5 0.0007 
 Median 1.5  1.3  1.3    
 Std Deviation 0.71  0.43  0.46    
 NETA         
 Mean 306  564  1,806  8.8 0.0002 
 Median 100  193  430    
 Std Deviation 612  900  3,136    
INFLOW         
 Mean 0.56  -8.4  6.7  2.7 0.072 
 Median 0.16  0.14  0.30    
 Std Deviation 1.7  109.6  40.9    
BETA         
 Mean 1.4  2.5  1.3  0.79 0.45 
 Median 0.89  0.94  0.84    
 Std Deviation 6.4  11.7  5.7    
BOND         
 Mean 0.83  0.22  0.78  3.2 0.043 
 Median 0.0  0.0  0.0    
 Std Deviation 3.6  0.93  3.2    
The number of observations is 812 before missing data deletions.   
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS:  CGOH = percentage of the fund's assets that represent capital appreciation; 
EXPRATIO = fund's expense ratio; NETA = the fund's total net assets, in millions; INFLOW = net inflows 
weighted by beginning net asset value; BETA = the fund's systematic risk as reported by Morningstar; 
BOND = percentage of fund assets invested in bonds.
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TABLE 1  
Descriptive Statistics by Level of Managerial Ownership 
PANEL D – Discrete Control Variables 
 
$0-
$100,000  
$100,001-
$500,000  
over 
$500,000  F-value Pr > F 
LGROW 15%  11%  9%  0.62 0.54 
MGROW 13%  17%  12%  1.1 0.33 
SGROW 14%  7%  11%  0.93 0.39 
LVALUE 5%  15%  7%  2.5 0.08 
MVALUE 4%  2%  9%  4.4 0.013 
SVALUE 5%  0%  11%  5.9 0.032 
LBLEND 16%  20%  13%  0.23 0.80 
MBLEND 6%  9%  9%  0.53 0.59 
SBLEND 2%  2%  11%  1.8 0.16 
SPECIALTY 19%  17%  8%  1.5 0.24 
 100%  100%  100%    
NEWMGR 15%  12%  6%  7.0 0.001 
 
number of observations 364  190  258    
percent of all observations 45%   23%   32%       
The number of observations is 812 before missing data deletions.   
 VARIABLE DEFINITIONS:  L/M/S GROW/VALUE/BLEND = 1 if the fund is a large/medium/small     
 growth/value/blend fund, and 0 otherwise; SPECIALTY = 1 if the fund is a specialty fund, and 0  
 otherwise; NEWMGR = 1 if the manager is in his first year, and 0 otherwise. 
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TABLE 2 – Abnormal Fund Returns 
Panel A – Regression Results 
 ANNUAL RTN  
AFTTAX RTN  
(Distrib)  
AFTTAX RTN 
 (Distrib & Sale) 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
OWN0-100 -0.37 -0.16  1.7 0.70  0.49 0.29  
OWN100-500 2.0 0.83  3.9 1.55  1.4 0.84  
OWNOVER500 3.2 1.66  4.9 2.32*  2.1 1.42  
LAGINFLOWS -0.018 -2.60*  -0.018 -2.74**  -0.012 -2.45*  
EXPRATIO -0.61 -0.76  -0.63 -0.70  -0.11 -0.17  
BETA -0.011 -0.36  -0.013 -0.40  -0.0019 -0.08  
BOND 0.13 1.30  0.12 0.82  0.014 0.17  
NEWMGR -0.0013 0.01  -0.28 -0.20  0.18 0.20  
LAGCGOH - -  1.7 0.70  0.49 0.29  
 
number of observations           519  519  519  
Year fixed effects?           yes  yes  yes  
Fund style indicators?           yes  yes  yes  
*,** t-statistic is significant at the 0.05 or 0.01 level, respectively. 
Panel B - Comparisons between Ownership Coefficients  
 ANNUAL RTN  
AFTTAX RTN  
(Distrib)  
AFTTAX RTN 
(Distrib&Sale)  
OWN0-
100 
OWN100-
500  
OWN0-
100 
OWN100-
500  
OWN0-
100 
OWN100-
500  
OWN0-100 - 0.11  - 0.14  - 0.24  
OWN100-500 0.11 -  0.14 -  0.24 -  
OWNOVER500 0.0002 0.25  0.001 0.28  0.01 0.29  
Panel B reports the significance of the F-value using a one-tailed test.  All dependent variables are in excess 
of the fund-style mean.                                                                                                                                     
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS:  ANNUAL RETURN  = fund's annual return percentage; OWN0-100 = 1 if 
the manager owns $0-$100,000 in the fund, 0 otherwise; OWN100-500 = 1 if the manager owns $100,001-
$500,000 in the fund, 0 otherwise; OWNOVER500 = 1 if the manager owns over $500,000 in the fund, 0 
otherwise; LAGINFLOWS = one-year lag of net inflows weighted by beginning net asset value; 
EXPRATIO = fund's expense ratio; BETA = fund's systematic risk, reported by Morningstar; BOND = 
percent of fund assets invested in bonds; NEWMGR = 1 if tenure is less than one year, 0 otherwise; 
LAGCGOH = one-year lag of the percentage of the fund's assets that represents capital appreciation.    
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TABLE 3 – Abnormal Turnover  
 
Panel A – Regression Results 
 Coefficient t-value
OWN0-100 47.3 1.70  
OWN100-500 -15.0 -0.66  
OWNOVER500 -20.2 -1.06  
INFLOWS -0.018 -0.97  
NETA -0.0035 -2.05*  
LAGANNRTN -1.1 -2.53*  
NEWMGR 16.6 1.34  
LAGCGOH -0.30 -2.72**  
 
number of observations 571  
Year fixed effects? yes  
Fund style indicators? yes   
*,** t-statistic is significant at the 0.05 or 0.01 level, respectively. 
Panel B - Comparisons between Ownership Coefficients 
 OWN0-
100 
OWN100-
500  
OWN0-100 - 0.003  
OWN100-500 0.003 -
OWNOVER500 0.001 0.39   
Panel B reports the significance of the F-value using a one-tailed test. 
Variable Definitions:  TURN = fund's turnover ratio in excess of the mean for 
the fund-style category; OWN0-100 = 1 if the manager owns $0-$100,000 in 
the fund, 0 otherwise; OWN100-500 = 1 if the manager owns $100,001-
$500,000 in the fund, 0 otherwise; OWNOVER500 = 1 if the manager owns 
over $500,000 in the fund, 0 otherwise; INFLOWS =   
net inflows weighted by beginning net asset value; NETA = the fund's total 
net assets, in millions; LAGANNRTN = fund's one-year lagged annual return 
percentage; NEWMGR = 1 if the  manager is in his first year, and 0 
otherwise; LAGCGOH = one-year lag of the percentage of the fund's assets 
that represents capital appreciation.   
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 TABLE 4 – Abnormal Fund Tax Costs  
 
Panel A –Regression Results    
 LTTOT  PCTGAIN  PCTTAX  
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
OWN0-100 -0.13 -1.75  -0.14 -0.18  -0.093 -0.71  
OWN100-500 -0.16 -1.84  -0.19 -0.26  -0.18 -1.39  
OWNOVER500 -0.13 -1.83  -0.23 -0.29  -0.20 -1.43  
INFLOWS 0.00012 -1.08  -0.0015 -1.42  -0.00012 -0.54  
NETA 0.00001 1.71  0.000002 -0.29  0.000001 -0.12  
LAGCGOH 0.0047 2.92**  0.0042 2.13*  0.00047 1.40  
NEWMGR 0.15 3.25**  0.42 1.09  0.029 0.40  
ANNRTN -0.00077 -0.25  -0.0027 -0.15  0.00084 0.26  
LAGANNRTN 0.0030 -1.70  0.043 1.31  -0.0085 1.76  
PCTGAIN 0.86 2.45*  - -  - -  
 
number of observations 199  572  572  
Year fixed effects? yes  yes  yes  
Fund style indicators? yes   yes   yes  
*,** t-statistic is significant at the 0.05 or 0.01 level, respectively. 
Panel B - Comparisons between Ownership Coefficients  
 OWN0-
100 
OWN100-
500  
OWN0-
100 
OWN100-
500  
OWN0
-100 
OWN100-
500  
OWN0-100 - 0.33  - 0.44  - 0.12  
OWN100-500 0.33 -  0.44 -  0.12 -  
OWNOVER500 0.50 0.33  0.38 0.45  0.07 0.39  
Panel B reports the significance of the F-value using a one-tailed test.   All dependent variables are in 
excess of the fund-style mean. 
Variable Definitions:  LTTOT = ratio of a fund's long-term to total capital gain distributions; 
PCTGAIN = fund's per-share capital gain payout as a percent of NAV; PCTTAX = fund's per-share 
tax due by taxable investor as a percent of NAV; OWN0-100 = 1 if the manager owns $0-$100,000 
in the fund, and 0 otherwise; OWN100-500 = 1 if the manager owns $100,001-$500,000 in the fund, 
and 0 otherwise; OWNOVER500 = 1 if the manager owns over $500,000 in the fund, and 0 
otherwise; INFLOWS = net inflows weighted by beginning net asset value; NETA = the fund's total 
net assets, in millions; LAGCGOH = one-year lag of the percentage of the fund's assets that 
represent capital appreciation; NEWMGR = 1 if the manager is in his first year, and 0 otherwise; 
(LAG)ANNRTN = fund's (one-year lagged) annual return percentage. 
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